## AFFAIRS IN EUROPE.

LONDON, Jan. 13, 1854. Brange Rumers-Reported Powering of a Spanish Princes - A Commercial Retrosp of of the Trade of England for the past year.

ar nounces the death of the new bern Princess.

ar nounces the death of the new hera Princess
Two curious rumors are here affect
the first is, that the aforesaid royal infant died by poison; and the second that reduce Albert was under arrest for treason, in Windsor Carte, for four hours, on
Wednesday.
Believe them who may, but rengember that there is
seidom an oke unaccompanied by the devouring element.
A glarce at the several phases of the mercantile world

affected by the will of war, unfortunately localing but too surveys, will be doubtless anceptable to the New York readers as they he first month of 1854. Transactions, in dueses a will elimin teertainly be, by a cessation of peaceful relations, which may not be resumed till the wante of the present gehr ain, may in the end of next December of monstrate in some massure, by geterence to the figures I am about to sead our instructional bie injury inflicted apon commerce by the straggles of contenting nations, and the book availability to which trade and speculation are compelled so injuriously.

They year, indeed, that has just elapsed only fairly be referred to in troublous times for what peace can do for exterprise, and what enterprise can effect for prospecity. At the corresponding period of inst year, satisfications of success in every branch of carter and industry were of the most encouraging condition. In the dividend, which should be a sea of the consoless and the commercial dividend, which should be a sea of the consoless and the commercial dividend, which should be a sea of the consoless and the commercial dividend of the consoless and the commercial dividend of the consoless and the commercial dividence of paper payments being preferred to payments in species. First, for instance, sould refuse to receive ready money the guidations in each, from which fire per cent would be deducted, being also its get the old canned for two per cent at the bank, and producing dividend, the bank and realized by their present appearance, under the result of the present time of paintees.

A temporary parie, indeed, at the close of the year trained and aims for the transactions for those paries. The panie however, passed away, and the three per cents now stand, with the dividend, at 94%, in the first of and the work of the commercial dividends.

A temporary payies with regard to Australian trained for an once and payments of the control of success for agricultural operations of success for agricultural operations of success

which accome don't is suit face. In a decime a major to was not, however, maintained, and no topic hav been so generally dwelt upon as the present high price of securities in the face of dearth, and even famine, social disconnent and foreign soillier. I shall dwell on this subject in its other details in my next.

W. R. M.

## Our Paris Correspondence.

PARIS, Jan. 12, 1854. The Late Circular of the Fore gn M nister - Comments of the Press and the People-The Bourbon Fusion- Reception of the News from Kalefat-The Corn Question and the Cabinet-Beet Root Sugar and Beet Root Whiskey - Organization of the Street Sweepers - Health of M. Turgot.

The important "circular" of M. Drouyn de l'Huys the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, is still a subject of engrossing interest; perhaps not so much for any light it has thrown upon the great question of the day-for, indeed, in this respect, nothing is said that was not known before, but the moderation of its tone has called forth a world of discussion apparently singularly congenial to the fertile Parisian The Emperor, say some, treats Russia as a wise man should always treat his foe-as one in whom

he may one day find a friend.

Think you, they add, that Napoleon intends to proceed side by side, to go all lengths; with England to fling into the lap of that nation, whom his uncle aptly termed "a nation of shopkeepers," all the rich military material of France? No such thing. He measures too accurately his own position; he will go just so far as to commit England to the war; he will even share the honor or odium, as parties may please to esteem it, of its first struggles and successes. His fleet shall bear the tricolor in companionship with the union Jack, a French cannonade shall wake the echoes wherever an English gun is fired; but there will be a limit to all this. Do you not perceive that Napoleon has never yet uttered a word which prevents him from withdrawing from the contest the moment Russia. by some nominal concession, shall permit him to say he has no further anxiety for the equilibrium of Europe? England, once fairly implicated in the war, do you not see that it cannot last six months without its whole nature being changed—that it will asymmeted a general character that the Danubian provides and Constantinople seelf will be a mere drop in the cotan? What will Napoleon care for such a war when it takes India for its field of battle? Mo: the nephew of the exile of St. Helena will, in his own retiring, impassible way, see fit in proper time to offer himself as a mediator between the contending parties. Nothing can be more graceful and disinterested than such a role. For three hundred years England and Russia have been perfect Siamese Twins in their alliance. The quantity of tar and tallow Great Britain purchases of the Czar is sufficient to see the world in flames—but flames of a peaceful and benevolent character. Why should they waste villainous saltpetre? But England's blood will be up, and in proportion as France retires Russia will be arrogan; other parties by this time will be in the fleid; the whole continent may be a belt of fire; then will be the hour for that man who, of all that ever lived, may be said "to bide his time." England will none of his mediator ship; she cannot say it was not offered. The media is at its height—just where the great Napoleon, if he could burst the marble slumbers of his tomb. he has no further anxiety for the equilibrium of Eu

ship: she cannot say it was not offered. The melocis at its height—just where the great Napoleon, if he could burst the marble simulers of his tomb, would wish to find it; and be sure his beit is not the man to forego all the advantage it offers. In prison he who wrote: and "the sword of Barras shall cut asynder the treaties of Vienna," will not love so favorable an occasion of cutting them into sbreds.

There are others again who affect to take an entirely opposite view of Napoleon's policy, as instanced or rather confirmed by "the circular." These parties allege that the Emperor feels too surely that the Czar has an arrow in his quiver the drawing of which will at once spread dismay and confusion among the armed hosts of France. They maintain that the "fusion" is anything but a dead is ter, but, on the contrary, a great fart, that Orleanists and

hegitimists have rushed into each others arms, and have sacrificed on the altar of divine right every jeal of the catalian of the freed arms a noble forgetfulness of all hygones, and that the great cause was a control of the recedure. He great cause was a control of the recedure, and the great cause of the catalian of the Freedo arms—Last this legislation of the recedure, as no one had control of the catalian of the Freedo arms—Last this legislation of universal—that it is a real check on Napoleon's mercentes, as no one had control that the specification of universal—that it is a real check on Napoleon's mercentes, as no one had control that the specification of the freedo arms and the sacrification of the freedom and the sacrification of the freedom and the sacrification of the sacrification of the sacrification of the sacrification of the freedom and the sacrification of the s

The following extract from the Union of the 11th inst, after these remarks, will not be altogether uninteresting. It is the organ of the utramontane Catholics, but not of the general hierarchy of France:

Different opinions are entsrtained as to the primary causes if the conflicts which have put the East in arms, but all are unanimous as to the consequences which would centl for Europe if it should decide on which any part in the affair except by mediation, and by the paotion authority of its cabinets. It is in Englant alone that wallhe possions are raised. War is the instinct and the interest of England; and there are to be found in Paris some overheated imagications which will take fire at its crise of batter. Our duty is to repeate the very least moment what the consequence of war would be in the present state of Except and we shall keep our opinions free from errors and from madness. More than once since 1830 we have said that Europe, from the weakness caused by peace, would be one day in a condition not to be able to make war. Her not our prognostication been already too well justified? Wast, in fact, would war be after such a long enervation of characters and is eas? War, in regular times, is a struggle between States which simple political justice has not been able to discum of their reful les and prebessions; in the troublous times in which were thing would be confused; mixed up, the animosity of States among themselves and that of people signist States—an immense Swalowed; pp. And his is what is called for by the meetings in England. The piliticians of Paris casmot have reflected on the subject. There is only one party which would be confused in which swall we have been such as duth thicks it would be able to let it lone on a 1 the States—a party known in France by frightful disasters, and known both in Italy and Germany by the struggles, the principle of which actin less that the second of any explosion. This party the state is a structiveness. If this we the case, must it not be seen into what party

of 30,000 men—that the Turkish troops had intentionally retired on their centre, and had drawn the Russ ans as far as Kalefat, a position fortified in a most formidable manner, but which, at a fistance, had all the appearance of having been abandoned—that then the Turkish batteries were suddenly unmasked, causing the Russians considerable loss, whilst the Ottoman reserve, which had passed the Danabe in the right, and were concealed behind a wood, took them in flank and compelled them to retreat; and that the inhabitants of Lesser Wallachia had powerfully sided the Ottoman army. The same journal goes on to state, as information the cirrest ness of which it guarantees, that the alleged reverses of Akiska and Alexandropol are far from having the importance which it has been sought to give them, and that since the adoption of another plan of campaign by the Divan, the face of things had entirely changed; that the Turks had obtained some successes, and were preparing for others. That a convoy, carrying 15,000 men, as reinforcements for the army of Asia, was to leave Batoum on the 3d, if the state of the weather permitted—that this convoy had nothing to fear from the Russian vessels, which were not in a condition to leave Sebastopol either to attack the Turks, or to revictual their army in Asia, which was in a very unsatisfactory condition.

The following article from the Moniteur on the great corn question, which bids fair to outbid in interest even that of the East, will be found interesting. It is in reply to an observation made by one of the journals, that the failure of the last corn harvest had taken the government by surprise, and that it had, therefore, been unable to adopt the necessary precautions. After recapitulating the various measures adopted by the government to guard against the consequences which, without them, would result from a deficiency in the harvest, the Moniteur says?—

sures adopted by the government to guard against the consequences which, without them, would result from a deficiency in the harvest, the Moniteur Says!—

what has been the result? Thanks to the solicitude of the government, the population and the traders in corn having been warred in time, the price of provisions immediately became in proportion with the real state of things; as person slumbered in a false security; the trade theplayed a useful activity, was able to make purchases arread in preper time, and wheat arrived abundantly and regularly in our port. From the month of August the arrivals increased, and by 31st December, 1883, upwards of the mildons of heatelitres—that is to say more than double the quantity at the same period of 1816—1814 entered France for the joinets, pilon of the intern. In a boowledge of the trata which regulates prices according to the treality of circumstances, and which presents fectious fells, is attended certainly with the inconvenience of traposing same temperary sairfies on the concurrence but it has also this immense aironates, that such person being warned in time can reluce his conduction of the limits of what is absolutely necessary, and that private persons, as cell as the government are not exposed to deployable mistakes. I is no doubt affil cting that wheat is dear, but what would be infinitely more so would be not to have any. The government is about by the subundance when it wishes, but what it can and what it ought to do, is to tell the truit to the country, and to adopt all the necessary measures distated by prucence to diminish the difficulties of the situation. Regret in politice, no more than affection, cannot change exact position of things; all the assertions in the world cannot prove that in the crisis of 1816 47, the government the of that time did not leave the public in a descrital security. The circulty, so trangullaling, of the Minister of Agriculture and Commence, to of November 16, 1846, and tray felling the public of the security of the security of t

The War Prospects on the Baltte.

[Fon the lookon News, Jan. 2]

The necessity of watching closely the movements of Russia in the Baltic becomes daily more apparent. Some coup is evidently projected in that quarter against the spring. Emissaries have been despatched to England and America, with a view to obtain the means of increasing the efficiency of the Baltic fleet; a despatch has at the sense time been transmitted from St. Petersburg to St. ckholm, which has had the effect of inducing King Oscar to remodel the higher departments of the Ministry of War, and to invite his Diet to appoint a joint committee of the States to receive an important and confidential communication. At Berlin, where the movements both of Denmark and Sweden are anxiously notel, it is understood that a negotiation has been opened between those powers, with a view to a league offensive and defensive in the event of a general war, and the fortifications on the Sound are being strengthened. Russia doubtless has two objects in view in the Baltic; to put itself it a condition to strike a blow against the allies of Turkey if a chance arises; and to advance the cherished project of extending its territory to the ocean. Scandioavian peninsul's is and has been coveted by Russia as much as the lands between the Black Sea and the Adriatic, and equal care has been taken, sitently and insiduously, to cast her tois around it. In 1809 Sweden was compelled to code Finland to Russia, a d along with it fornes by the north and the Aiand isses to the south. The advanced post of the Russian empire and army was thus brought within the distance of tweety-nine English miles from the Swedish capital. By a treaty contend-do between the courts of St. Petersburg and Stockholm to 1828, Russian vessels were exempted from all daties in the Norwegian ports north of Transea, and now the whole of that region derives its entire sup lies of grain from the Russian ports on the White Sea, from which, also, fishing an ports north of Transea, and now the whole of that region

rienced in his own person marked sights from the legit mate soveraigns of Europe. When, in 1837, he made the tour of Germany, he was received at the different courts with scarcely communicivity. In 1821 the royal family of Prussia rejected his overtures for a matrimonal altimace; when the ex-King of Sweden, Gustavus IV., diet, all the old legitimate courts were estentatious in their assumption of mouraing fur him. Bussia, there can be little doubt, is availing itself at this moment of all these circumstances to wheedle and builty the King of Sweden, with a vew to gain him in the first instance to subserve its views against England and France, and in the second to increase its influence over the government of the Scandinavian penlosula, with a view to its ultimate incorporation with the supprements of the Scandinavian penlosula, with a view to its ultimate incorporation with the empire. Russia counts also upon its ascendancy to the councils in the royal family of benmark, and the not very remote prospect of an opportunity to claim the succession to that throne. Russia, Sweden, and Denmark command the Baltic; for the maritime power of Russian singly is as nothing. The success of Russian intrigues in the north, therefore, while it would materially embarrass England in any war in which we might be engaged, is pregnant with obstructions to our commerce with the Baltic, unless the right steps were taken at the right time.

Our best, our only sure, reliance for connecating and defeating these intrigues is in assidually cultivating the good will borne by the Scandinavian people to England. Policy dictates, of course, a friendly and conciliating deportment owards their monarchs; but the surset guarantee for the good faltin, and friendly offices of these monarchs will be found in their consciousness that to, ally themselves with Russia against England and France, will alternate and irritate their subjects. The Swedes especially are naturally and encellating the intercourse between Stockholm and the western districts of S

free people, they, and still more the Norwegians, are averte to the prospect of being subjected to a despotation of the prospect of being subjected to a despotation of the one hand, and Bassis on the other, if the former were left to bear the brunt of the battle alone, would be most unqual. In 1849 the total population of Sweden did not exceed 3,433,895; in 1845 that of Norway awa only 1,238,471. The north of Norway and Stockholm, it will be kept in mind, are desendent for their supplies of food upon Russia; and the outpoot of the Russian Rests and armies is within a few hours and 55 tookholm, which is but weakly fortified. To repel a Russian fleet, the King of Sweden has only 10 shaps of the line, 20 'rigates and samiler vessels, and armies and the subject of the subject of

no other object but to raise against the Russian Empire the Tartar bordes of the Cancasus and the Caspian, and, by paralysing the Russian influence over the Mongols, the Persians, and the Kirghese, to render abortive the projects against the Indian possessions of Great Britain.

[From the London Times, Jin 7]

If we are to believe certain of our foreign contemporaries, other causes are at work in urging this country to a rupture with Russia than those which appear on the surface and catch the attention of the public. It is not Menschikoff—no, nor the Danabian Principalities, nor even Sinope itself, that is influencing our councils. These are the pretexts which we may craftly and ostentatiously pit forward. We may talk about the balance of power, the necessity of keeping Russia out of Turkey, of opening the Dardanelles, and preserving Constantinople from the gripe of the northern giant; but they sed deeper into the matter than all that comes to. They know that while we are talking of Europe we are thinking of Asis; that if we are ready to meet Russia on the banks of the Danube or the Black Ses, it is because we would rather fight her, there than on the banks of the Indus or in the Bay of Bengal; that we are, in fact, in a terrible fright of a Cossack and Turkeman invasion of our Eastern empire; and that we view in the Emperor Nicholas a worthy successor of Genghis, of Timour, or Nadir Shah. We would entreat our cotemporaries to dismiss from their minds these profound speculations, and to believe us when we assure them in all sincerity that we have as little apprehension of seeting the Cossacks, the Turkomans, or Khir, ese water their horses on the banks of the Ludus as on those of the Thames. What ideas Russia may be brooding over with respect to our Indian empire of course we cannot tell. It is not by any means impossible that a barbarous Power, puffed up by the pompous enumeration of its half starved myriads, proud of its diplomatic successes, and looking back on a long list of inglorious triumphs, may look fo won India, and by the sword we are prepared to maintain her. We do not trust to the fact that our government, with all its faults, which we have never been anxious to extenuate, is undoubtedly the best to which any Asiatic people has ever been subject. Something we neight count on the superiority of our administration, and on the benefits in the shape of security to life and property, and the germs of many useful institutions, which we have already conferred on Hindostan. We might count somewhat on gratitude: but we rest our hold of India on surer and less deceptive grounds. We hold India by means of a large, well paid, well disciplined, and well equipped army, excellently provided with all the munitions of war, and maintained in a position of comfort and abundance which the troops of the Emperor of Russia never knew. Provided with a large park of artillery, admirably served, and with a numerous and efficient cavalry, consisting of men norm in and inured to the climate, and commanded by European officers trained to Indian war, and thoroughly sequalisted with all its viciestiades, the Indian army is, we believe, fully equal to a far more actions task than that of defending India against all the attacks of all the foes that Russia can bring against her. It is not suggested that, notwithstancing the influence Russia is acquiring over the wild tribes and pathless deserts of independent Tartary, a civilized army, with the usual accompaniments of be gage and artillery, could cross the vast waste which intervenes between the Sea of Aral and the

b gage and artillery, could cross the vast waste which intervenes between the Sea of Aral and the Hindoo Koosh, scale the most rugged and difficult mountain barriers on the face of the globe, and arriva in condition to open a campaign on the burning plains

of Hindostan. If the right hand soad were taken, the fanatical spirit of Bothara and Affghanistan would offer obstacles almost insurmountable, and the commissariat of an army on these wild and desolate steppes would seem to surpass the power and ingennity of man. If, on the other hand, the left hand road by taken, the descent into India would present difficulties such as for a civilized army, would be wholly insurmountable. This, then, is not the danger we are disposed to dread. That which we are told produces the liveliest apprehension and emotion, is the prospect of an invasion under the auspices of Russia by a cloud of Tartar cavalry, armed, accounted and dissiplined after the most approved fashion of war in Central Asia. These troops would certainly have no artillery and no baggage, and their habitual endurance of famine and misery might enable them to dispense with some, at least, of those commissariat supplies which even a Russian army cannot do without. Still the difficulties of the march would be, even to these wild and savage hordes, all but insuperable.

It might occur to those who represent England as trembling before such an invasion as this, that if we had not been much more than a match for such disorderly and predatory banditti, we should never have retained her. Let those who affect to believe we are frightened by the threat of a Tartar invasion read the account of the Pindaree campaign, and see how easily disciplined troops can scatter to the winds the efforts of treg"lar valor, even though that valor be stimulated by despair and conduced by thoroughly daring and experienced leader!. The Pindarees knew the country in which they fought, the tactics and weapons of the enemy with whom they engaged, they were thoroughly hardened against the effects of their native climate, and were powerfully assisted by the appearance in the ranks of their enemies for the first time of the now familiar cholera. Yet, with all these advantages over a force of northern soldiers, strangers to the language, the manners

The Following account of the town and nort of Schastopol, the Russian programs, will be found integrated the Russian programs, will be found integrated the Russian programs, will be found integrated the state of the town and nort of Schastopol the Russian programs, will be found integrated the state of the town and the state of the Russian in the rapidly growing empire of the Czara, it galte, until 1786, having been occupied by nothing the state of the sta

the prevalent winds are northeast and northwest.

Mexico, tee United States, and "Manifest De tiny."

[For the Longon Rings, Jon 7]

Some time has elapsed since we found it desirable to lay before European readers any particular observations on the state of Mexico. It is about eight years ago, as will be easily remembered, that the Mexicans were engaged in a desperate war with the United States, nor, will it be accessary for us to add, that these hostilities terminated disastronsly for the weaker Power. The territorial cessions chained by the Americans on this occasion included not only the auriferous province of California, but large districts besides, which still remain uninhabited and almost unexplored. It cannot, indeed, be said that these losses inflicted any serious damage on the Mexican nation, as it was still left in possession of territories far too extensive for its stanty population and its limited requirements; but the consequences of the defeat, co operating with the exhaustion produced by the war itself, proved altogether fatal to the prospects of the government and the general administration of the country. From that time to the present Mexico, with a constitution nominally republican, has continued in a state more nearly approaching to absolute anarchy than has ever been wit essed in recent times or in modern examples of lotity. There existed, in fact, neither law nor government at all deserving the name, and so eather was the dissolution of all institutions and the disorgan zero action of all society, that it was conceived the country must fall of necessity to the United States, to be by them dealt with in some manner or other, whether such a consummation was desired or not.

The last mails from Vera Cruz, however, have introduced us to a new phase of Mexican political santa Anna, whose part in the previous dramas a not likely to be forgotten, and who had returned to preside over the Mexican republic, is likely to reappear in a more dictatorial character than he at

present possesses. The Mexicans are heartily stok, in short, of republicanism and its accompaniments, and, though it is unjust to attribute to these or any other ignitions results which are chiefly due to their own national failings, they seem, at any rate, convinced that the worst stage of their country's decline coincides with the maintenance of republican forms. In reality, it can hardly be said that any of the South American States have ever, at any time since their emancipation, been so regulated as to give any species of government a fair trial; but this much is certainly true, that Mexicon has never been so utterly disorganized as when its affairs were administered by its own citizens under representative institutions, and never so well managed as when its government approached most nearly to the absolution of an individual.

Some reflections of this sort appear to have now induced them to return to the forms of monarchy in their least ambiguous shape. Santa Anna, it is said, is soon to be declared supreme governor, under a title which is not yet determined, but with authority about which there can be no mistake. He is to be styled either "Grand Elector," or "Captain-Genera" or possibly "Emperor;" but he is to represent a strong and centralized power, and to exercise this power without any restriction on the part of a popular assembly. The views of the Mexicans appeat exceedingly simple. They want the taxes to be collected, the public servants to be paid, the roads to be cleared of banditi, trade to be protected, and society to be maintained in its daily developments; in a word, they want the country to be governed, and, so long as there shall be some power to enforce order, they do not greatly care how such power is constituted, or whether such order may repose or not upon the strict provisions of law. These conditions fair and to society to be maintained in its daily developments; in a word, they want to be not republicanism of the State, the advantage would be cheaply purchased.

It is remarkable, how

with but with the people concerned.

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aracter from the Anglo-Saxon race, enter,
all the privileges of self-government, into a
munity organized upon principles beyond theircomprehension? Already are serious misgiving
entertained respecting the effect of the Texas votes
aupon the administration of the Union, and it is clear
that all the perils apprehended from this quarter
would be indefinitely multiplied by any further accessions of old Spanish territory. Meither the Mexicans nor the inhabitants of the South American republics are made for self government; that point has
now been demonstrated by the experiments of a
quarter of a cutury. Ye these States, with their
inhabitants, must either carry their leaven into the
American Union, or the Union must be confined to
the present, however, there is little doubt that Mexico will reap immediate advantage from the termination of a preposterous experiment; and if, as is
announced, the restoration of a strong government;
state may be developed to a point which twelve
months ago would have been considered wholly unapproachable.

The Social and Religious Position of Sardinia.

The Social and Religious Position of Sardinia.

[From the Lindon Times Jan 13]

We have more than once bespoken the attention and sympathies of the public for the kingdom of Sardinia. This State, small in comparison with some European Powers, but considerable both in resources and atmosphine and contrasted with the other govern-

and strength when contrasted with the other governments of Italy, has been for some time reforming its internal administration with an earnestness, wisdom and success, entitling it to the admiration and support of all enlightened commanities. It is not impossible—on the contrary, it is highly probable—that we may ultimately see in Piedmont an Italian State rationally governed, an Italian people content we may ultimately, and an Italian people content when the contrary, it is highly probable—that we may ultimately, and an Italian sovereign relying upon those popular affections which form the basis of durable monarchies. An administration, framed upon the plan of a double Chamber and a responsible Cabinet, with a comparatively free press, has been hitherto found to answer ow well that, though the State has not yet ecoped the inevitable troubles of a novitate, it is, upon the whole, one of the strongest States of its class, at its chief perils, indeed, now arise from the enty and malice of these rulers who can ill endure the spectacle of institutions so signally contrasted with their own.

A lesson instructive to all nations, and not without its moral for ourselves, may be learnt from the question which now threatens the Sardmina government with its chief difficulty. Sardmina, as the reader must be aware, is not only a Roman Catholic country, but a country most emphatically Popish and priest-ridden. About the soundness of its faith in the eyes of the Papal See there is no manner of coubt, and the reforms now pr jected by its government in ecclesiastical matters are entirely free from any heretical leanings towards religious liberty or apprintual enfranchisement, in the Protestant sense of the terms. The simple truth is that Piedmont Is overrun, and, as we may literally say, eaten up by its church establishments and its elergy=2-the idle and least serviceable members of the protession obtaining, as usual, a lion's share of the consecrated revenues, to the proposition of the proposition, and the property of the prov